The full report is available below, but please read on for a brief summary of our top 10 key findings.

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Key findings

We are at an inflection point in terms of how ethnic minorities vote.
In five of the seven seats Labour lost in July, over 25% of the population is Muslim, and Labour’s vote share collapsed by 28 points among Muslim voters. Leicester East – the only seat gained by the Conservatives – has the highest Hindu population in the country, and their party’s highest vote share was achieved in Harrow East, the third-most Hindu seat.

Ethnic minority opinion now spans the entire political spectrum. These differences are not yet fully expressed in terms of voting behaviour (particularly due to the Conservatives’ staggeringly bad defeat in 2024, where proportional swing hid large changes in behaviour), but will be in time.

See pages 11–13 of the report.
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We should not understate how poorly the right performs, and how well the left does, among ethnic minority Britons.At the 2024 election, the combined vote share of Labour, the Greens and the Liberal Democrats was 66% among ethnic minorities, while that for the Conservatives and Reform UK was 26%. Any discussion over Labour’s problems with minority voters and Conservative gains needs to be tempered by these facts.

See page 12 of the report.

The demography of right and left is vastly different between white and non-white voters.

White voters differ hugely on their educational profile, with non-graduates drifting right over the last 20 years, and graduates to the left. Amongst non-white Britons, however, graduate level education makes you proportionately more likely to be Conservative.

The Conservative Party will continue to have its esoteric coalition of affluent minorities and non-graduate whites and Labour the opposite. In other words, the Rishi Sunak - Lee Anderson spectrum is a feature, not a bug, of right-wing politics.

See page 11 of the report.

There is a large degree of disagreement between ethnic minorities – to some degree larger than that between the white and non-white population – on the role of the state.
British Indians and British Chinese voters tend to be right wing on the economy, expectations of the nation state, and views on welfare, making them the most right-wing ethnic groups in the country.

Other minority groups – like those of Bangladeshi and Caribbean descent – sit much more firmly on the economic left. If politics reorients to be based primarily around economic divisions, this may lead to even greater fragmentation of minority opinion.

See page 64 of the report.

There are a clutch of issues – immigration and multiculturalism – where ethnic minorities are much more positive than the rest of Britain.
These issues have much less predictive power in estimating how non-white people vote than for white people. We also see that non-white Britons tend to be more concerned with Britain getting ahead economically and with material success than those who are white.

See pages 47 and 59 of the report.

At future elections, Labour cannot rely on ethnic minority voters as a ‘bloc’ of support.‍

It is true that the Labour Party still convinces a far greater proportion of minorities with ‘warm’ views of the party to vote for it than the Conservative Party does.

Among many ethnic groups, though, there is a fundamental disjunction between opinion on the salient issues of the day and voting patterns. Our polling suggests that Labour support among ethnic minorities is an ossified cultural and historical legacy that could disappear very quickly.

See page 23 of the report.

There is evidence of some prejudice among certain ethnic minority voters toward other minority groups.
Clear and neutral data is needed to expound on these findings. Among some non-white groups, a minority – but in some cases a sizeable minority – express anti-LGBTQ+ sentiment, which is not reflected to the same extent amongst the wider white population. Over a quarter of respondents from some minority groups said they would not like to have a gay couple as a neighbour; 8% of white voters said the same.

See pages 49–51 of the report.

The degree of importance placed amongst minority respondents on their personal religion is out of step with the growing secularism of white Britain.
To a degree, this substitutes out the importance of the nation state for minority groups - and is another area we would have explored more without time and resource constraints.

Just 6% of white Brits say that being part of a religious community is important to how they see themselves, versus 28% for ethnic minorities. Among white respondents, 61% classify themselves as ‘not at all religious’, but only 20% of ethnic minorities say the same.

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See pages 33–35 of the report.

There is a wide difference between minority groups on their experience of racism and of representation.
The British Caribbean and British Chinese populations represent two ends of the spectrum. British Caribbean respondents see themselves reflected much more in popular culture and positions of power, but personally perceive much higher rates of personal racism. Meanwhile, British Chinese people feel culturally excluded, but do not perceive anything like the levels of racism that other groups do.

See pages 55–59 of the report.

Ethnic-minority and white Britons share common diagnoses about what is politically important, what they want out of a government, which cultural institutions are important, what British culture is, and what it means to be British.
Less than 10% of people (8% of white Brits and 5% of ethnic minorities) think being white is an important factor in being ‘truly British’, for example. Whilst the purpose of the paper is to alight on important and unique aspects of non-white Britain, there is far more that unites Britain than divides it.

See pages 38–41 of the report.

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This is just scratching the surface of a report that is a treasure trove of data on a complex array of topics. I would encourage you to read what follows in full, to get a full sense of our findings.